Signals for 1-14 January 2023

Fortnightly newsletter tracking high-level policy signals sent by China’s top leaders. For more information visit About Five Things.

China’s media does report on Covid-19, just not prominently. Not one of the top five most widely circulated articles in the country’s official media in the first and second weeks of this year was about the epidemic, despite estimates of some 900m people being infected. Instead, coverage included reports from a plenary meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI – the internal Party body charged with policing breaches of Party rules; it has formidable powers), about a propaganda ministers’ meeting, and other events featuring continuing reminders about the importance of last November’s Party national congress.

Whether this communication failure (discussed in depth by China Media Project hereand usefully itemized by Agence France-Presse here) will prove to be a blip remains to be seen (see item 5. below). From our perspective, monitoring China’s official media remains an important tool for interpreting the actions and intentions of China’s opaque leadership.

1. Political signalling

The CCDI articles (Chinese/ Machine translation and Chinese / Machine translation) underline the point that regardless of recent events, politically nothing has changed. The preponderance of ideological and abstract statements reflects the need for Party organs and government bodies responsible for the political functions to indicate their acknowledgement of the political order announced at the congress.

The period between the Party congress and the National People’s Congress is normally a transition period; major policy decisions are put on hold while China’s new ruling team first installs itself then draws up its plans for announcement when the full government meets in March.

This time, however, this period is deeply problematic due to the economic fallout and social discontent caused by the zero-Covid policy. Many commentators have suggested that the lack of a strong central response to the chaotic end of Covid-19 lockdowns pointed to disagreements within the central leadership, possibly even to efforts to curtail Xi Jinping’s power. More likely in our view is the timing of the problem. China found itself facing a serious economic slowdown at a point of transition; given that responsibility for handling Covid-19 had already been passed to local governments, along with the requirement that they should also be stimulating growth, there was more a risk of pressure at the local level than central.

2. Change signalling

Although the information coming out of China is poor, so far the worst-case scenarios suggested for China’s move away from its zero-Covid policy appear not to have occurred. However, the abrupt reversal of zero-Covid, plus the stronger support for private business announced at the government’s Central Economic Work Conference held in mid-December, point to a substantial and rapid shift in outlook at the very highest level of Chinese governance.

Though there is no information about how this happened, the whys are clear enough: first, the economic impact of continuing lockdowns; second, the costs and resource demands being placed on local governments; and third, the discontent this was giving rise to.

The interesting thing here is the problems China’s leaders found themselves facing in issuing a change signal. While Xi clearly exercises total or near total control over the highest echelons of power and national propaganda, the system struggled to convey how the change of direction and new messaging should be carried out. There were a number of mixed signals. This does point to a well-planned, thought-through process of change.

3. Central-local signalling

Against this background, China’s chaotic exit from zero-Covid looks more and more like a central-local coordination problem. The government successfully mobilized local officials to carry out its zero-Covid policies; where it failed was in sending clear directions on how to end them. Its 11 November circular announced 20 prevention and control measures, apparently aimed at allowing local governments to determine what was most appropriate for their own conditions. Unclear about the overall framework in which these measures should be applied, local officials opted to see them as part of the zero-Covid goal they had been told to follow for the previous two or so years. The popular unrest that followed led to the issuance of a further ten points on 7 December; although these were aimed at allowing incremental steps, local officials opted to understand them as granting them powers to act as they saw fit in their own jurisdictions, in particular when it came to addressing the impact on their economies and resources of continuing lockdowns.

A follow-up central government circular issued on December 26 confirming the end of mass Covid testing; no further efforts would be made at returning to zero-Covid, instead local governments would have to figure out their own best strategies for managing.

What this points to is a major, continuing issue concerning central-local management. Recent decades saw China establish a central-local system based around signals from the centre that localities then interpreted according to local conditions and their own needs.

Operating against the backdrop of economy growing at 10% annually made it easy for local officials to send positive messages to the center. It also allowed them to meet the thousands of targets sent down from Beijing. Growth covers gaps. However, with the economy slowing from this breakneck pace – and likely to slow further – local officials will find governance harder.

The increased lack of media transparency that has accompanied Xi’s centralizing of powers over his decade as paramount leader will prove an obstacle to the more sophisticated information flows that China will need.

4. Economic signalling

Though policy-making may be on hold, regulation isn’t. Recent weeks have seen a slew of new rules announced covering internet security, data storage and consumer privacy. Here, the government is continuing with its efforts to control China’s big internet businesses but also wanting to encourage them to think about growth.

This can be plausibly seen as an easing of the clampdown on China’s big private internet business, yet in our view it is also a continuation of Xi Jinping’s goal of having a digital economy that contributes to the state’s goals rather than finding its own way. That points to a return to growth for technology companies in the short term but lingering question marks over their longer-term prospects.

5. Future signalling

Xi’s new year’s message for 2023 (Chinese / Machine translation) offered a tour of the horizon from the standpoint of China’s highest leader, covering the usual points – the CPC and its achievements, the economy, the military, Taiwan, etc – with a robust view of the present:

Today’s China is a China where dreams come true one after another. Today’s China is a China full of vitality. Today’s China is a China that continues the national spirit. Today’s China is a China that is closely connected with the world

今天的中国，是梦想接连实现的中国。今天的中国，是充满生机活力的中国。今天的中国，是赓续民族精神的中国。今天的中国，是紧密联系世界的中国

It included an acknowledgement that not everyone in China might have the same view:

China is such a big country that different people have different demands and different views on the same matter; this is normal, and consensus must be built through communication and consultation.

中国这么大，不同人会有不同诉求，对同一件事也会有不同看法，这很正常，要通过沟通协商凝聚共识。

But only after noting that “strength comes from unity” and before adding that having a single point of view remained the goal, followed immediately by a call for China and Taiwan to be as one:

With more than 1.4 billion Chinese people thinking and heading in a single direction, there is nothing that cannot be achieved, no hurdles that cannot be surmounted. We are a single family on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I sincerely hope that compatriots from both sides will meet each other hand in hand to build long-term well-being for the Chinese nation.

14亿多中国人心往一处想、劲往一处使，同舟共济、众志成城，就没有干不成的事、迈不过的坎。海峡两岸一家亲。衷心希望两岸同胞相向而行、携手并进，共创中华民族绵长福祉。

China faces an uncertain future. A big focus of ours in the coming months will be the ability of its central officials to craft the appropriate policies and supporting communications that will be needed to guide the country, or whether the chaos surrounding the end of its zero-Covid regime turns out to be more of the norm.

Top-ranked articles for 1-14 January 2023

% = percentage of publications carrying the article

1. President Xi Jinping delivers New Year’s message for 2023国家主席习近平发表二〇二三年新年贺词Xinhua News Agency, 31 December 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 54%

2. Xi Jinping delivers important speech at Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection习近平在二十届中央纪委二次全会上发表重要讲话Xinhua News Agency, 9 January 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 54%

3. CPC Central Committee Propaganda Department calls on all local news organizations to carry out the 2023 “New Year’s Walk to the Grassroots” campaign中宣部要求各地各新闻单位认真开展2023年“新春走基层”活动Xinhua News Agency, 5 January 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 48%

4. Xi Jinping holds talks with the Philippines’ President Marcos习近平同菲律宾总统马科斯举行会谈Xinhua News Agency, 4 January 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 46%

5. Propaganda ministers hold national conference in Beijing全国宣传部长会议在京召开Xinhua News Agency, 4 January 2023Chinese/ Machine translation / 45%

6. Work together to achieve the goals and tasks set by the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China为实现党的二十大确定的目标任务而团结奋斗Xinhua News Agency, 31 December 2022Chinese / Machine translation / 43%

7. Communiqué of the Second Plenary Meeting of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 中国共产党第二十届中央纪律Xinhua News Agency, 10 January 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 43%

8. Adhere to reform and innovation, carry forward the spirit of struggle / Strive to promote the modernization of political and legal work坚持改革创新发扬斗争精神 / 奋力推进政法工作现代化Xinhua News Agency, 8 January 2023Chinese/ Machine translation / 43%

9. Xi Jinping Holds Video Meeting with Czech President Zeman习近平同捷克总统泽曼举行视频会晤Xinhua News Agency, 9 January 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 40%

10. “Xi Jinping Walks into People’s Homes” published《习近平走进百姓家》出版发行Xinhua News Agency, 00 January 2023Chinese / Machine translation / 38%

For more information about Five Things on China’s Leader’s Minds, visit About Five Things on China’s Leaders’ Minds or email [email protected].